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Abstract
The new tax plan approved by the U.S. Senate, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, claims to offer the largest benefits to
individuals in the middle of the income distribution. In this article, I examine the impact exogenous tax changes have
on income shares of individuals in the bottom 50 percent of the income distribution. The findings suggest that lower
taxes, that are exogenous to fluctuations in business conditions, have minimal direct benefits for individuals in the
bottom 50% of the income distribution. Claims that trickle-down economics lift all income shares through lower taxes
are not supported by the empirical findings.
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1. Introduction
Much literature concludes that greater redistribution of income requires higher marginal
tax rates. Lindsey (1987) was one of the first to point out that the 1981 top rate cut in the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, or ERTA, from 70% to 50% coincided with a very large increase in
the share of income reported to the IRS by the top 1% of the income distribution. He argues that
the tax cut was a principal cause of this increase, as it reduced the penalty for receiving (or, to be
precise, reporting) taxable income. Feenberg and Poterba (1993) document that the share of
income reported by the top 0.5% of the population increased slowly but steadily beginning in 1970,
accelerated around 1980, and shot up in 1986. They contend that this trend is consistent with the
pattern of declining effective tax rates on affluent Americans that began in 1970 and picked up
steam with the rate cuts of 1981 and 1986. Karoly (1994) presents Census Bureau data showing
that inequality among families, after reaching a post-war low in 1967-68, began to increase during
the 1970s and continued to rise through the 1980s. Although the trend toward greater inequality
began in the late 1960s, about two-thirds of the increase in the Gini coefficient between 1968 and
1989 occurred between 1980 and 1989. Bakija and Slemrod (2000) show that the top rate increases
of 1990 and 1993 increased progressivity, but the expansion of capital gains tax preferences in
1997 and, possibly after, offset the higher top rates. Milanovic and Taleb (2015) demonstrate that,
given the current state of world income distributions, top income earners may work harder to
increase their relative status rather than promote overall economic growth within a country (i.e. it
is easier to lobby for a change in tax law than to improve GDP growth). This would then tend to
increase inequality as legislation is passed that, relatively speaking, benefits top earners more than
low or middle-income families. Saez and Zucman (2016) attribute at least part of the rise in
inequality to the rollback of New Deal-era legislation since the 1980s. Namely, taxation has
become less progressive and financial deregulation has potentially allowed financially and
politically connected families and firms to accumulate large amounts of wealth.
However, recently, the new tax plan (the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) approved by the U.S.
Senate, contains the largest benefits for individuals in the middle of the income distribution. In
2019, people in the middle of the income distribution, earning approximately $50,000 to $70,000
annually would see their tax burden drop by 7.1 percent. Individuals earning between $20,000 and
$30,000 would experience a 10.4 percent decrease in their tax liabilities; whereas, high income
earners would get a 5.3 percent tax cut1. It should be noted that the new tax plan has received
criticism in regard to disproportionately benefiting households at the upper end of the income
distribution, which may further exacerbate income inequality in the U.S. Critics assert that the new
tax plan, by doing away with the alternative minimum tax and the estate tax, provides a larger
benefit to top earners.
To get a better picture of how changes in taxes affect the middle class, in this paper I
examine the impact exogenous tax changes have on the income shares of individuals in the bottom
50% of the income distribution. The analysis allows us to better understand if the benefits of the
higher potential output from lower taxes trickle down to individuals in the bottom 50% of the
income distribution. To preview the results, I find that a one-unit positive shock to exogenous tax
rates leads to an approximately 1.5% decrease in the real GDP growth rate and a 0.3% decrease in
the national income shares of individuals in the bottom 50% of the income distribution. The
findings suggest that lower taxes that support long-run growth have minimal direct benefits for
individuals in the bottom 50% of the income distribution.
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The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the data and the
methodology, Section 3 presents results and Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
The annual data used to capture the shares of pre-tax national income attributed to individuals in
the bottom 50% of the income distribution are from the World Wealth & Income database. Pretax national income is the sum of all pre-tax personal income flows accruing to the owners of the
production factors, labor and capital, before taking into account the operation of the tax/transfer
system, but after taking into account the operation of the pension system. The population is
comprised of individuals over age 20. The base unit is the individual (rather than the household),
but resources are split equally within couples. The time-series of the pre-tax national income shares
for the bottom 50% are shown in Figure 1. The annual measures of tax changes are from Romer
and Romer (2010). Particularly, exogenous tax changes are changes that are not taken to offset
shocks that push growth away from normal. These tax changes are used to raise normal growth
and are different from the counter-cyclical changes in marginal taxes. Romer and Romer (2010)
identify exogenous tax changes from the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and
Congressional reports, in two ways. The first narrative includes the absence of any discussion of
counteracting shocks or of a desire to return growth to normal. The second narrative has to do with
the reasons given for tax changes, such as identifying that tax changes are not related to other
factors affecting output in the near future. Romer and Romer (2010) categorize two types of
exogenous tax changes: those for deficit reduction and those for long-run growth. Figure 2 shows
the time-series of the exogenous tax changes. All of the tax increases were deficit-driven.
However, the tax cuts were mainly enacted to support long-run growth. Real GDP data used to
control for the dynamics of output is from the FRED database. The sample period analyzed is 1962
to 2014.
2.2 Methodology
The model specification used to capture the dynamics between the exogenous tax changes and
income shares of individuals in the bottom 50% of the income distribution is similar to the model
specification in Romer and Romer (2010). Thus, I estimate2:
∆������50� =

+ ∑ =1 ∆��− + ∑

=1

∆��− + ��

(1)

where Bottom50 captures the pre-tax national income shares of the individuals in the bottom 50%
of the income distribution3 and ∆� are Romer and Romer’s (2010) exogenous tax changes. Since
the tax series, ∆�, reflects policies adopted for reasons unrelated to other factors that might
influence real output and income distribution in the near term, Romer and Romer (2010) assert
that the model specification in (1) should yield unbiased results. Again, including lags of real
output helps control for the dynamics of output that might influence the relationship between the
2

Note, cointegration is not an issue in eq. (1) because tax changes do not have a unit root. As such, the three
variables do not share a common trend. Results are reported in the appendix.
3
As a robustness test, I perform the analysis using post-tax national income shares for the individuals in the bottom
50 percent of the income distribution. As presented in the results section, there are no differences in the findings.

bottom 50% of national income shares and overall economic performance. To ensure that there is
no reverse causality from the bottom 50% of national income shares and real GDP to tax changes,
Granger causality tests are performed. The results show that the tax shocks are unrelated to past
changes in real GDP or the bottom 50% of national income shares4.
3. Empirical Results
Cumulated impulse responses from equation (1) are estimated using a one-year lag5. Figure 3
shows the implied effect of a shock of one percent of GDP to the tax series on the path of real GDP
and the national income shares for the bottom 50%. The figure shows that the effect is consistently
negative for both variables. After a shock to exogenous tax changes, real GDP drops by
approximately 1.5 percent and national income shares for the bottom 50% drop by 0.3 percent.
The findings imply that tax cuts spur subsequent economic growth; however, the direct impact on
the national income shares for individuals in the bottom 50% of the income distribution seems to
be minimal. Implications of trickle-down economics that low taxes lift all income shares are not
supported by the empirical findings. In addition, in the appendix section, I present the contributions
of tax changes in explaining the variance of the prediction error of real output growth and national
income shares for the bottom 50%. The results confirm the exogeneity of tax changes. None of the
other variables have any predictive power over tax changes. In contrast, 17 percent of real GDP
squared prediction error and 10 percent of the bottom 50% of national income shares squared
prediction error are attributed to innovations in tax changes.
Lastly, in Figure 4, cumulated impulse responses for post-tax national income shares are
shown. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the previous results.
4. Conclusion
Using Romer and Romer’s (2010) exogenous tax changes, I analyze if tax cuts support economic
growth and lift up the income shares of individuals in the bottom 50% of the income distribution.
The empirical findings show evidence against the implications of trickle-down economics: that
low taxes lift all income shares. Particularly, I find that an innovation to exogenous tax changes
leads real GDP to drop by approximately 1.5% and national income shares for the bottom 50% to
drop by 0.3%. This implies that tax cuts would raise income for the bottom 50% of income earners
but not by very much.
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Results are reported in the appendix.
Lag length tests using the Akaike Information Criterion are presented in the Appendix in Table I, which suggest a
one-year lag.
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Figure 3: Responses of Real GDP and Bottom 50% (Pre-Tax) to a unit shock in Exogenous Tax Changes

Figure 4: Responses of Real GDP and Bottom 50% (Post-Tax) to a unit shock in Exogenous Tax Changes

Appendix
1. Results from Table I suggest that the optimal lag for estimating equation (1) is one-year lag.
Table I: VAR Lag Selection Criteria
Lags

AIC

0
1
2
3
4

5.80
5.54*
5.79
6.30
6.87

2. For the variables to be cointegrated, the requirement is that all three variables need to have a
unit root. Referring to Phillips-Perron Test in Table II and KPSS Tests in Tables III&IV, we
observe that exogenous tax changes do not have a unit root. As such, all three variables do not
share a common trend.
Table II: Phillips-Perron Test for a Unit Root6
Sign.
Level
1%
5%
10%

Crit. Values
-3.55
-2.91
-2.59

Ex. Taxes

TestStat
RGDP

-6.44***

-2.72

Bottom 50%
0.42

Table III: KPSS Test for Stationarity about Level7
Sign.
Level
1%
5%
10%

Crit. Values
0.739
0.463
0.347

Ex. Taxes
0.24

TestStat
RGDP

Bottom 50%

1.16**

1.09**

Table IV: KPSS Test for Stationarity about Trend
Sign.
Level
1%
5%
10%

6
7

Crit. Values
0.216
0.146
0.119

Ex. Taxes
0.113

TestStat
RGDP
0.17**

Bottom 50%
0.15**

The null hypothesis under the Phillips-Perron Test is that series are non-stationary.
The null hypothesis under the KPSS Test is that series are stationary.

3. To reassure that Romer and Romer’s (2010) tax changes are exogenous, Granger causality tests
are performed. As shown in Table V, the growth rate in real GDP and changes in the bottom 50%
of national income shares do not Granger-cause tax changes.
Table V: Granger Causality Test
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
∆RGDPt-1
∆Tt-1
∆Bottom 50%t-1

∆RGDPt
F-stat
4.23**
3.72*
3.38*

p-value
(0.04)
(0.06)
(0.07)

∆Tt
F-stat
0.09
0.95
0.21

p-value
(0.75)
(0.33)
(0.64)

∆Bottom 50%t
F-stat
p-value
19.83*** (0.00)
0.64
(0.42)
1.18
(0.28)

4. Variance Decomposition results presented in Table VI reinforce the implication that Romer and
Romer’s (2010) tax changes are largely exogenous. 99.4 percent of the ten-step-ahead variance in
tax changes is explained by its own innovations.
Table VI: Variance Decompositions

∆RGDP
∆T
∆Bottom 50%

∆RGDP

∆T

∆Bottom 50%

78.30
0.31
25.87

17.56
99.40
10.47

4.13
0.28
63.65

